
DealMakers - Q3 2026 (released November 2026)
Tapping into the township economy
by Johann Piek and Mmakobela Mathabe | PSG Capital
Four noteworthy events tell the story. In July 2026, Fibertime, the low-cost township fibre operator, passed its 500,000th (1) home – a business that had 10,000 (2) subscribers in early 2024 and is now aiming at two million by 2028. In the same month, Pepkor folded its Flash business into Shop2Shop to create a R21,3bn merchant commerce platform with a JSE listing flagged. (3) Six weeks later, Shoprite closed on a controlling stake in R&A Cellular, buying its way into some 15,000 spaza tills it will never own.(4) And Lesaka, having spent several years and several billion rand assembling a base of 130,000 small merchants, is waiting on the Prudential Authority to complete its R1,1bn purchase of Bank Zero.(5)
Not one of these deals adds a supermarket. That is the point. The township economy has stopped being a development-finance conversation and has become a corporate finance one. The capital is no longer chasing the storefront; it’s going into the infrastructure beneath it: payments, property and connectivity, where cash flows are recorded, assets are securable, and an exit can be described to an investment committee.
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First, a distinction
“Township” and “informal” are often used interchangeably, and they shouldn’t be. Informality is a regulatory status: the absence of registration, tax compliance and formal employment. It exists everywhere, from Sandton pavements to Soshanguve roadsides. The township economy is a place. It contains a great deal of informal trade, but it also contains VAT-registered wholesalers, franchised quick-service restaurants, licensed liquor traders, funeral parlours and clinics.​​​​

Piek

Mathabe
The difference is not semantic, and treating these terms as one and the same is how capital gets mispriced in both directions.
Moving on from the size question
The headline numbers have done their work. Standard Bank’s Township Informal Economy Report 2025 puts the sector above R900bn a year; (6) while GG Alcock – the doyen of kasinomics – puts the broader market closer to R1trn.(7) Some 11,6 million people live across more than 500 townships.(8)
No board still needs persuading that the market is large. What these figures cannot tell anyone is what exposure costs, how a transaction should be structured, or how an investor gets out. That is where the analysis now has to go.
The Capitec precedent
South African financiers have seen this shape before, and misread it badly. Capitec was built out of PSG Group’s micro-lending businesses to serve lower-income and unbanked South Africans, a market then regarded as commercially unviable, served by a start-up given little chance against the (then) ‘big four’ banks.(9)
Twenty-five years later, Capitec is the most valuable bank on the JSE, worth more than R510bn, serving 26 million active clients on a return on equity of 31%.(10) The lesson is not that low-income markets are easy. It’s that the mass market was structurally underpriced because the incumbents had never built an operating model capable of serving it profitably. The binding constraint was distribution, not demand.
The township economy poses that question one layer down. Not “can these customers be banked?”, which has been answered, but “can these businesses be financed?”.
The rails, not the shelves
Payments is where the deal activity has concentrated, and the logic is the same for every acquirer. A device behind a spaza counter turns an invisible cash business into a recorded, recurring, attributable transaction stream. That stream helps make lending, insurance and working capital underwritable in a market that has never had a credit history.
Pepkor’s combination of Flash and Shop2Shop creates a platform that processes more than R200bn a year.(11) Lesaka has reached a comparable position by acquisition, rather than merger, and the Bank Zero deal completes the picture: a banking licence lets it fund its lending book with deposits instead of wholesale debt. Shoprite’s purchase of R&A Cellular buys distribution for its financial services into shops it could not justify building.(12)
The storefront, by contrast, is a crowded and capital-hungry trade. Shoprite’s container-format Usave eKasi lets it operate where a conventional supermarket cannot,(13) and Clicks has just opened its first KwaMakhi store in Tembisa: a third the size of a standard Clicks, with no pharmacy and no clinic, but everyday low pricing and smaller pack sizes for shoppers who cannot afford to buy in bulk.(14) Tiger Brands, meanwhile, now describes informal stores as the fastest-growing channel on its books.(15) These are sensible defensive moves. They are not, on the whole, where the superior returns sit.
Bricks and fibre
Township retail property has been compounding quietly for years. Exemplar REITail has grown distributions at a double-digit compound rate since listing in 2018, on a portfolio valued above
R11bn with conservative gearing and vacancies under 3%, and is still buying at initial yields north of 9%.(16) Fairvest, Vukile Property Fund and Dipula Properties occupy adjacent ground.
The more instructive case for structurers is Fibertime, which has imported a property technique into telecommunications. As it builds each township network, it sells the infrastructure into a fund and leases it back, keeping debt off its own balance sheet and recycling capital straight into the next build.(17)
And the property opportunity runs well beyond the shopping centre. As businesses formalise, they need premises; as supply chains develop, they need warehousing and last-mile facilities; as healthcare, education and professional services expand, they need somewhere to trade from.
Caution from the Competition Commission
In September 2026, the Competition Commission published its Rural and Township Economy Project.(18) It is not a market inquiry and carries no binding force, but it is a data-rich platform the Commission plainly intends to use.
Two findings should temper the bull case. Roughly half of township and rural households spend outside their local economy, and not only on discretionary purchases, which undercuts the assumption of captive local demand.(19) And only about one in 10 township businesses sells through an online marketplace.(20) The payment rails have arrived; the selling rails have not (yet!). For acquirers, the report is also a clear signal that consolidation in township payments and route-to-market now sits squarely in the Commission’s field of view.
The risks
They are structural, rather than sentimental. Diligence is hard where records are manual. Tenure, municipal service delivery, wayleaves and crime bear directly on asset-level returns. Policy is a live variable, with spaza registration drives and a support fund of around R500m implemented inconsistently,(21) and immigration politics sitting uncomfortably close to township retail. Reputational risk attaches to any perception that formal capital is displacing local operators rather than financing them. And exit remains the hardest question: the trade buyer universe is narrow, and the listings contemplated by Pepkor and Fibertime require scale that few assets in this space have reached.
Final thoughts
The township economy is not a sector. It is an ecosystem spanning, inter alia, retail, manufacturing, services, food, healthcare, logistics and connectivity. What has changed is not the demand, which was always there, but the arrival of financeable operating models, recorded cash flows and, increasingly, a credible way out. Capitec’s history suggests the cost of dismissing that shift is considerable.
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1 https://mybroadband.co.za/news/fibre/658974-r5-per-day-fibre-network-reaches-half-a-million-homes-in-south-africa.html
2 https://mybroadband.co.za/news/fibre/642064-from-10000-to-400000-in-two-years.html
3 https://techcentral.co.za/pepkor-builds-r21-billion-fintech-giant-and-plans-to-list-it/283992/
4 https://techcentral.co.za/shoprite-closes-its-bet-on-the-spaza-till/285567/
5 https://lesakatech.com/newsroom-all/bank-zero-snapped-up-for-r1-1-billion
6 https://www.standardbank.co.za/southafrica/business/bizconnect/help-me-grow-my-business/articles/insights-from-the-launch-of-the-township-informal-economy-report-2025
7 https://businesstech.co.za/news/business/821520/south-africas-r1-trillion-invisible-underground-economy/
8 https://www.forbesafrica.com/small-business/2023/12/21/the-big-backroom-boom-in-south-africas-townships
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capitec_Bank
10 https://www.capitecbank.co.za/globalassets/pages/investor-relations/financial-results/2026/audited-results/cpify26_summary.pdf
11 https://iol.co.za/business-report/companies/2026-07-22-pepkors-flash-to-merge-with-shop2shop-to-create-a-leading-merchant-platform/
12 https://techcentral.co.za/shoprite-takes-majority-stake-in-ra-cellular/278979/
13 https://dailyinvestor.com/retail/62901/shoprites-big-informal-economy-expansion/
14 https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/2026-08-27-clicks-introduces-new-township-retail-brand/
15 https://www.businessday.co.za/companies/company-strategy/2025-12-01-tiger-brands-eyes-growth-in-informal-market/
16 https://propertywheel.co.za/2026/05/exemplar-reitail-reports-15-3-year-on-year-increase-in-distribution/
17 https://colinilesmedia.com/posts/building-where-incumbents-wont
18 https://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/CC_Rural-and-Township-Economy-Project-2026.pdf
19 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2026-09-03-kasinomics-competition-commission-casts-new-light-on-sas-township-economy/
20 https://www.sowetan.co.za/news/2026-09-14-siyabulela-makunga-odds-stacked-against-small-businesses-in-townships-and-rural-towns/
21 https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/government-ramps-support-help-spaza-shops-access-r500-million-fund; and https://www.citizen.co.za/business/r500-million-spaza-shop-support-fund-r179-million-spent/





